Architecture in plain words
How geoNFT works
Four components, three ledgers' worth of evidence, one question answered: did this drone really record these pictures, here, at this time, and is the record complete?
The idea in one paragraph
A drone carries a small gateway with a hardware key. That key signs every position fix and every picture during a flight. The signed observations are stored by an OGC Connected Systems API, the pictures on IPFS, and a hash of each observation goes to a private Hyperledger Fabric ledger. When the flight ends, the drone signs a seal over its own chain of observations, and the whole flight is summarised in a manifest. The hash of that manifest is minted on Fabric as an NFT: the geoNFT of that flight. Customers who hold a flight certificate in their wallet can load the flight in QGIS and recompute every hash themselves.
1. Trusted Connected Systems
Trusted Connected Systems is an extension of the OGC API – Connected Systems Standard. It keeps the standard's resource model (systems, deployments, datastreams and observations) and its HTTP interface, and adds the trust that the standard leaves open: a ledger identity for every system, observations signed by the system itself, a sealed end to every deployment, and a ledger record of what was stored. A client that speaks OGC API – Connected Systems can read the data as usual.
It is the flight stack used by drone operators. It binds a drone to the person who flies it, and binds the telemetry and pictures to the drone.
| OGC API – Connected Systems | Trusted Connected Systems adds |
|---|---|
| System | A did:indy identity on Hyperledger Indy, approved by the operator's passkey, with the system's signing key published on that DID |
| Deployment | Opened and closed with the operator's passkey; a flight token bound to the drone key; a drone-signed seal; a manifest whose hash is minted as the geoNFT |
| Observation | A DPoP proof signed by the drone's secure element on every post, a drone chain and a server chain, and an anchor hash on Hyperledger Fabric |
| Observation result (image) | Picture bytes on IPFS, referenced by content id and SHA-256 that the drone signed |
| Read access | Reads of a deployment's observations require proof of a valid flight certificate from the customer's wallet |
Its parts:
- Operator console at operator.geonft.eu. Operators sign in with a passkey (no password), enroll drones, and open and close flights.
- Drone gateway. An ESP32-S3 board with an ATECC608 secure element sits between the flight controller and the ground station. It holds two keys: an Ed25519 identity key, and a P-256 signing key that never leaves the secure element. It never talks to the internet itself.
- Hyperledger Indy. Enrollment writes the drone's identity key to Indy as a
did:indy. The drone then publishes its signing key on its own DID, so anyone can check which key belongs to which drone. - Authorization server. Opening a flight issues an eight-hour access token bound to the drone's signing key (OAuth 2.0 DPoP) and a short pairing code.
- MAVProxy
tcsmodule. The ground station exchanges the pairing code for the token, hands it to the gateway, and posts every signed observation. - Connected Systems API at
cs.geonft.eu, implementing OGC API – Connected Systems with the Trusted Connected Systems extension. Each drone is a system, each flight a deployment with datastreams for position and images. The API checks every proof before storing an observation, and refuses posts once a flight is sealed or closed.
2. geoNFT Fabric ledger
A private Hyperledger Fabric network operated by the three partner organisations (SecdMSP, GeoidworksMSP, EngineeringMSP) on the channel geonftchannel. It has two chaincodes:
assetsstores one record per accepted observation: its SHA-256 hash, the drone DID, the operator, the time it was accepted, and the observation URL. Hashes are batched every 30 seconds.deploymentsmints one NFT per closed flight. The token holds the deployment hash (the SHA-256 of the canonical manifest), the manifest itself, and its owner, the operator. The chaincode recomputes the hash before writing.
Only the Connected Systems identity may write. New flight NFTs must be endorsed by Secure Dimensions and by GeoID Works or 4113 Engineering, so a single organisation cannot mint a record on its own. Verifiers read the NFT through ledger.geonft.eu, a read-only API next to the 4113 Engineering peer, so the answer does not come from the service being checked.
It is the Fabric token that fixes the manifest of one flight: which drone (DID and signing-key thumbprint), which operator, start and end time, how many observations in which order (server chain head), the drone's own signed chain and seal, and how the flight was closed. Change one observation and the hash no longer matches.
3. Certificate service
The commercial and authorization side, at portal.geonft.eu. It has its own accounts (Keycloak realm customers, sign-in with a passkey) and its own database. It never shares users with the operator side.
- Catalog. Flight analysts (role
issuer) publish closed flights either as Included in the subscription or as Classified, each with a GeoXACML 3 policy. - Orders. Subscribers get included flights through a monthly PayPal subscription. Classified flights are requested and granted or denied by staff.
- Certificates. An issuer agent (ACA-Py) offers an AnonCreds credential
flight-certificatewith two attributes,deploymentIdandpolicy, to the customer's wallet. The portal calls it a license. - License proof. When QGIS asks Connected Systems for the observations of a flight, Connected Systems asks the portal to prove the license. The portal sends a proof request to the linked wallet and grants access only if the wallet presents a valid, unrevoked certificate for that flight.
4. GeoNFT Wallet
The GeoNFT Wallet is an iPhone app, distributed through Apple's TestFlight (how to install) and built on the open-source Bifold wallet of the OpenWallet Foundation. It connects to the portal by QR code, accepts flight certificates, shows their status (active, end date, revoked), and answers proof requests with a tap.
The credential is bound to a link secret that is created in the wallet and never leaves it; the portal keeps no copy. That is why a lost phone is handled by connecting a new wallet and receiving fresh certificates, not by restoring the old one.
5. geoNFT plugin for QGIS
The plugin signs in with the same portal account, lists the flights you hold a license for, draws their observations on a map, and checks the flight against its geoNFT. It does the cryptography on your computer: it recomputes the manifest hash and both chains, checks the drone's signatures, compares picture bytes from IPFS, verifies the Fabric endorsement signatures against pinned CA certificates, and reads the drone identity from Indy. See the QGIS guide and how to read the result.
What you can trust, and why
| Claim | Evidence | Who could break it |
|---|---|---|
| This drone took this observation | ES256 proof by the drone's secure-element key; the key is published on the drone's did:indy | Only someone with physical access to that chip |
| No observation was dropped or reordered | Drone chain (boot, n, prev) signed by the drone, plus the seal | Gaps are visible; they cannot be hidden |
| The stored record was not edited later | Manifest hash minted on Fabric and endorsed by two organisations | Two partner organisations together |
| This picture is the one the drone signed | SHA-256 of the IPFS bytes equals the anchored hash and the drone's imgh | Nobody without the drone key |
| You are allowed to use this flight | AnonCreds certificate in your wallet, proved when you load the flight | Revoked when the subscription ends or staff withdraw it |
A flight closed without a seal proves the operator's decision, not that the drone's chain is complete. Observations that never reached the server are counted as gaps, not recovered. Only the last boot segment of the gateway is sealed. The QGIS report states each of these cases explicitly.