Consumers · Step 3

Read the verification result

After Verify against ledger, QGIS opens a report titled Deployment verification. It starts with one verdict, lists the facts it read from the ledger, then shows every check grouped in six levels, from the Fabric record down to the drone's identity on Indy.

An example report

This is what a fully verified, sealed flight looks like. Numbered markers point to the parts explained below.

Replica of the QGIS window for a sealed flight with 146 observations and 24 pictures. Hashes and identifiers are examples.

① The verdict

The coloured heading is the answer in one line. It follows a strict rule:

HeadingRuleWhat to do
Verified against the ledgerNo check failed, and every required check could run.The flight is the one minted on the ledger, complete as far as the report says. Read the info lines for details such as gaps.
Verification failedAt least one check failed.Do not rely on the flight. Look for the ✗ lines and the list of observations that do not match, then contact the analyst who published it.
Verification incompleteNothing failed, but a required check could not run, for example because a service was unreachable.Run Verify against ledger again later. Check the log under Log Messages › geoNFT.

Under the heading you see the flight name and its deployment id.

② The facts read from the ledger

Deployment hash (ledger) and (computed)
The first is the hash stored in the flight's NFT. The second is what the plugin computed from the manifest on your computer. They must be identical.
Minted, Transaction, Block
When the NFT was written, the Fabric transaction id, and the block that contains it.
Endorsed by
The organisations whose peers signed the mint, each marked verified or not verified by the plugin's own signature check.
Ledger read from
The peer and organisation the ledger API read from, and when. Normally a 4113 Engineering peer, so the answer does not come from Secure Dimensions, which runs Connected Systems.
Lineage
How many observations Connected Systems listed for the flight, and the server-chain head the plugin recomputed from them.
Drone DID, Drone key (cnfJkt), Drone verkey (Indy), DPoP key on Indy
Who flew: the drone's identifier, the thumbprint of its secure-element signing key as fixed in the manifest, its identity key on Indy, and the signing key that the drone itself published on Indy (with the Indy transaction number and time).
Drone chain
How many segments the drone's own chain has (a new one starts at every gateway reboot), how many signed links reached the server, how many are missing, and whether the chain was sealed.
Pictures
How many pictures match both their anchor on Fabric and the drone's signature, out of all pictures.

Check statuses

MarkMeaning
✓ passThe check ran and succeeded.
✗ failThe check ran and found a mismatch. One fail makes the verdict failed.
– skippedThe check could not run; the small text says why. A skipped required check makes the verdict incomplete.
i infoA statement, not a test, for example gaps in an unsealed segment. It does not change the verdict.

③ The six levels

Each level builds on the one before. Read them from the top: if L0 fails, nothing below it can be trusted.

L0 · Ledger record and endorsements

Question: is there a genuine NFT for this flight on the Fabric ledger?

  • The NFT belongs to this deployment — the token id is this flight.
  • Minted by Connected Systems' identity — written by SecdMSP/csapi@geonft.eu, the only identity allowed to mint.
  • The mint transaction is valid in a block — Fabric accepted the transaction.
  • The endorsement signatures verify against the pinned CA certificates — the plugin checks the peers' signatures itself, using organisation certificates shipped inside the plugin, so it does not have to trust the ledger API.
  • The endorsed write set is this NFT — what the peers signed is exactly this record.
  • Endorsed by SecdMSP and EngineeringMSP or GeoidworksMSP — a second, independent organisation co-signed. (Flights minted before 18 November 2026 carry only the SecdMSP endorsement; they show this check as skipped and the verdict as incomplete, because Secure Dimensions also runs Connected Systems.)

L1 · Manifest hash

Question: is the flight description the one that was minted?

  • The manifest hashes to the deployment hash — the plugin canonicalises the manifest (RFC 8785) and hashes it with SHA-256.
  • Connected Systems serves the same manifest — the service today still serves what was minted.

L2 · Server chain

Question: are all stored observations present, in the order they were stored, unchanged?

Connected Systems links every observation's hash to the one before it. The plugin re-folds the chain from the flight's lineage and checks that each stored value follows from the previous one, that the count matches the manifest, and that the final head equals the head fixed on the ledger. Insert, remove, reorder or edit one observation and this level fails.

L3 · Drone chain

Question: did the drone itself sign every observation, and did it sign the end of the flight?

  • Every observation carries a valid ES256 signature by the drone's secure-element key, the key fixed in the manifest (cnfJkt), naming this flight.
  • The drone numbers its observations (n) and links each to the previous one (prev). The plugin recomputes these links and the segments and compares them with the manifest.
  • The gateway's seal… and The sealed segment is complete — the drone signed the end of its chain and nothing is missing from that sealed segment.
  • The close reason fits the seal — a flight that claims to be sealed has a seal, and one closed without seal has none.
Unsealed flights and gaps

If the operator used Close without seal, the seal checks are skipped or reported as information, and gaps are listed as Gaps in unsealed segments. That proves the operator's decision to end the flight, not that the drone's record is complete. Observations that never reached the server are counted, never recovered.

L4 · Pictures and content

Question: are the pictures and position fixes exactly what the drone recorded?

  • Position fixes signed as anchored — for each position fix, the hash the drone signed (plh) equals the hash anchored on Fabric.
  • Each picture's result hashes to its anchor — the picture's record (content type, IPFS address, SHA-256) is the one anchored.
  • The picture bytes hash to result.sha256 and to the drone's imgh — the plugin downloads every picture from IPFS and hashes the bytes. They must match both the recorded hash and the hash the drone signed in the air.

L5 · Drone identity on Indy

Question: does the signing key really belong to the registered drone?

  • The drone DID is on Indy and its id derives from its Ed25519 verkey — the identity written at registration exists and matches its key.
  • The drone's Indy identity published the DPoP key the ledger fixed (cnfJkt) — the drone announced the same secure-element key on its own DID.

L5 relies on the Indy resolver's reading. If the resolver is unreachable, these lines are skipped without making the verdict incomplete.

Observations that do not match

If individual observations fail, the report ends with a list of their ids and a reason. The same value is written to each feature's chain_check column in the QGIS layer, so you can colour the map by it.

StatusMeaning
okEverything about this observation checks out.
not in lineageThe observation is on the map but not in the flight's stored record.
anchor differsIts hash differs from the hash in the lineage.
broken linkIts chain value does not follow from the previous one.
bad drone proofThe drone's signature is missing, invalid, by another key, or for another flight.
content differsThe content does not match what the drone signed.
picture differsThe picture bytes do not match the recorded or signed hash.
picture not readThe picture could not be downloaded, so its bytes were not checked.

④ The small print

The paragraph at the end states honestly what the plugin checked itself and what it took from others:

  • The endorsement signatures are verified on your computer against pinned certificates. That the transaction is valid and in that block is reported by the peer that was read.
  • The drone's signatures are checked against the key the manifest on the ledger fixes.
  • That this key belongs to the drone's did:indy is read from Indy through the resolver; the Ed25519 signature on that Indy record is not re-checked by the plugin.
  • Pictures are compared by SHA-256 with the bytes the drone signed; their IPFS content id is not recomputed.
  • A position fix is covered when the drone's signed hash equals its anchor hash.